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Abstract 
A number of scholars have been motivated to study the manner to which firms adjust their corporate 
finance strategies in light of the availability and easiness of accessing external sources of funding. Till 
recently, researchers have also been interested to analyse the external factors that allow firms to relax 
their fixed budget and the consequent impact on corporate strategies. These mainly include alterations 
in the composition of their funding and the second round effects on other corporate decisions such as 
on investment projects and their dividend policies. External financing can be assessed both from a 
policy perspective, i.e., via financial liberalisation policies, as well as other development in the 
financial sector such as availability of alternative bases of finance, both from banks and non-banks. It 
will thus be pertinent to examine the impact of FL policies as well as availability of financial resources 
on the capital structure of Mauritian firms and their investment decisions in a post financial 
liberalization period. A judicious investigation is undertaken and the empirical soundness of our 
different formulations tested with the techniques of panel data and GMM estimates. We compare and 
contrast the results in the 7 different sectors notably banking, insurance, leasing, hotel, oil, 
retail/distributive trade and the construction industry. For a better analysis, the full sample of firms is 
divided into several subsamples as follows: top 100 companies, firms in group-structure, those which 
are not in group structures, local firms, international firms, firms with good banking ties, those with 
good and poor corporate governance, listed and unlisted firms. By employing different econometric 
investment models, we found that all indices of FL, including the index of money market liberalisation, 
index of capital account liberalisation and overall financial liberalisation index have do not have any 
influence on private investment behaviour. In contract, higher amount of money in circulation, bank 
credit, leasing activities and subsidised financing from the Development bank have a positive impact on 
private investment expenditures. Development in the financial sector in terms of credit facilities offered 
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by insurance companies, venture capitals and the stock market activities have not been effective in 
inducing firms to increase their investment portfolios. 
Keywords 
corporate finance, strategies, internal finance, external finance, financial liberaliation 
 
1. Introduction 
Firms are epitomized as being profit maximisers but are constrained with a fixed and pre-determined 
budget that hinder optimum decisions in terms of investment, financing and distribution of profits. A 
number of scholars have been motivated to study the manner to which firms adjust their corporate 
finance strategies in light of the availability and easiness of accessing external sources of funding. Till 
recently, researchers have also been interested to analyse the external factors that allow firms to relax 
their fixed budget and the consequent impact on corporate strategies. These mainly include alterations 
in the composition of their funding and the second round effects on other corporate decisions such as 
on investment projects and their dividend policies (see for instance Hamid & Singh, 1992; Chipeta et 
al., 2012).  
External financing can be assessed both from a policy perspective, i.e., via financial liberalisation 
policies, as well as other development in the financial sector such as availability of alternative bases of 
finance, both from banks and non-banks. It will thus be pertinent to examine the impact of FL policies 
as well as availability of financial resources on the capital structure of Mauritian firms and their 
investment decisions in a post financial liberalization period. A judicious investigation is undertaken 
and the empirical soundness of our different formulations tested with the techniques of panel data and 
GMM estimates. 
We compare and contrast the results in the 7 different sectors notably banking, insurance, leasing, hotel, 
oil, retail/distributive trade and the construction industry. For a better analysis, the full sample of firms 
is divided into several subsamples as follows: top 100 companies, firms in group-structure, those which 
are not in group structures, local firms, international firms, firms with good banking ties, those with 
good and poor corporate governance, listed and unlisted firms.  
 
2. Organisation of Paper 
Following the introduction in section 1, a review of the literature regarding corporate strategies and 
external financing is made in section 3. This is followed by section 4 which make a critical analysis of 
the present literature and contribution of the present research, respectively; conducts some empirical 
investigations between external sources of finance and private investment; conducts empirical tests 
between external financing and capital structure choice; analyses the joint interaction between 
corporate investment, dividend and capital structure and section 5 concludes the chapter. 
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3. Related Literature Examining External Financing and Corporate Strategies 
Several cross-country studies have been conducted to test the influence of financial policies on private 
investment. While some research have focused in developed countries like Canada, France, Germany, 
Japan, Netherlands and the UK (see Aggarwal & Zong, 2006; Cleary et al., 2007), some fewer studies 
have analysed data for some emerging economies like China, Chile, India, Indonesia, Mexico and 
Taiwan (see Shen & Wang, 2005; Ghosh, 2006). For example, Henry (2000) examined 11 developing 
countries that opened their stock markets to large investors and showed that firms experienced an 
increase in private investment Jorgerson and Stephenson (1967) analysed the impact of economic and 
FL on the corporate sector for the US and found positive effect of financial liberalisation on corporate 
investment. Gallego and Loayza (2000) used a panel data set of 79 listed companies on the stock 
exchange of Chile over the period 1985 to 1995 to test for the relationship between FL and investment. 
Using the GMM estimator to estimate their investment equations, FL was found to reduce the financial 
constraints of firms. Similar results were also found by Devereaux and Schiantarelli (1990) who used 
data for UK firms (Note 1). Bond et al. (2007) used data (Note 2) collected by the World Bank 
Investment Climate surveys over the period 1998-2000 to analyse the relationship between investment 
and FC in Brazil and China. A structured investment model was derived, whereby borrowing was 
expensive but crucial for investment. It was found that the likelihood of being financially constrained 
was about 0.45 for Brazil and 0.33 for China. A reduction in the cost of external financing impacted on 
borrowing and firm investment. Chan and Dang (2012) analysed the impact of financial reforms on FC 
from publicity listed Chinese firms. By computing both a FL index and an index of capital account over 
the period 1996-2007, it was found that larger firms faced no credit constraints while small firms were 
financially constrained. Yet, further financial reforms retarded the accumulation of private investment 
because the advantages accrued to these large firms with reforms are gradually eliminated. 
Sundarajan (1987) examined the linkages among interest rates, debt/equity ratios, cost of capital, 
savings, investment and growth in Korea from 1963 to 1981 and found dynamic interaction among 
these variables. Any change in interest rates affected the debt-equity choices of firms and their WACC. 
In a series of paper, Dermirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1994), by using indicators of financial sector 
development and stock market development, showed that stock market development did not lead to 
lesser leverage and firms increased their borrowings in the external market. Genench (2003) found 
similar results for Turkish institutions. 
However, in a study of 1500 Indian firms over the period 1981-1990, Cobham and Subramaniam (1998) 
found no significant difference in the financing patterns between large and small firms. Moreover, it 
was found that bank loan and internal sources of finance were the two most important sources of 
finance. Agarwal and Mohtadi (2004) found opposite results by empirically exploring the effects of 
financial market development on the financing choice of firms for a sample of 21 emerging markets 
from 1980-1997. They reported that stock market development was significantly and negatively 
associated with the firms’ debt levels relative to their equity position, while banking sector variables 
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were significantly and positively associated with debt to equity ratio. Cook and Tang (2010) showed 
that financial constraints of firms played a key role in explaining the convergence of capital structure to 
a targeted level. It was observed that firms could adjust their capital structure faster when 
macroeconomic conditions were favorable. Amee (2013) studied FL and firm’s capital adjustments 
using evidence from South East Asia and South America. They studied the impact of FL on the 
adjustment of debt ratios on 12 emerging markets using firm level data from 1991 to 2004 and found 
that the speed of adjustments were relatively faster in South American countries than South East Asian 
countries. An uneven impact on firm’s financing behaviour in Asian Countries. 
There currently exists a large body of literature examining the relationship between external financing 
on corporate finance decisions such as investment and capital structure adjustments in developed 
countries like the U.S, U.K (e.g., Fazzari et al., 1988 (Note 3); Cho & Yoo, 2007; Aghion et al., 2007; 
Azamand, 2011; Prasad et al., 2001; Pandey, 2001; Jogernsen & Terra, 2003), in contrast with 
developing countries in Africa such as Mauritius where no such results are available. Of the existing 
results, most of them have tested the impact of FL, rather than FSD on private investment. Researchers 
have missed a number of pertinent variables that explicitly measure development in the financial sector. 
A careful analysis of the literature divulges that most work has concentrated in on the manufacturing 
sector and based on the Q model of investment. By using different sub-samples, the results are very 
puzzling, inconsistent and sometimes confusing (Note 4). Moreover, most of the times cross sectional 
and panel data models have been used. More advance econometric analysis is thus needed in a dynamic 
setting. 
This paper supplements to the existing literature and fills the missing gap in the literature and 
undertakes such a study in a small island developing state in Mauritius. Using a unique data set, it tests 
the influence of the alternative sources of finance from the non-banking financial sector on private 
investment and leverage, an issue that many researchers have missed. These include finance from 
banks, insurance companies, leasing, venture capital, stock market and subsidized financing from the 
DBM. A range of investment models are used. A sensitivity analysis is undertaken in the 7 different 
sectors: banking, insurance, leasing, hotel, oil, retail/distributive trade and the construction industry. 
Moreover, the following classification of firms is done: listed and unlisted firms, those belonging in 
corporate groups and those with good corporate governance practices. It determines whether financial 
liberalization (market forces effect), or rather financial development (development of institutions) 
influences investment level. An improved measure of liquidity (net-liquidity) is also used. 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1 External Sources of Finance and Changes in Private Investment 
We augment the different investment models of Cho (1995) to include in the different regressions, an 
index of FL and FSD. The different augmented econometrics equations therefore become as follows: 
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4.1.1 Empirical Results with Sales-Accelerator Model 
Our augmented Sales-Accelerator model from Cho (1995) is as follows:  
[Iit/Ki,t-1]= [Ii, t-1/Ki,t-2] +0 [Yit/Ki,t-1] + 1 [Yit-1/Ki,t-2] + FLit-1 + FSDit-1 + αi + αt + vit (1) 
In order to get a thorough analysis of the impact of financial policies on private investment, this 
research innovates, measures and differentiates between the impact of banks as well as non-banking 
sector development on private investment decisions. Moreover, it tests for the impact of FL and FSD on 
corporate investment separately (Note 5). 
Table 1 below presents the results from the GMM estimates of the sales-accelerator model using an 
unbalanced panel data set spanning from the year 1994 to 2007 with 298 companies. The dependent 
variable is private investment, Iit/Ki,t-1, while output (sales), lagged investments values and the 
different financial policy variables (FL index, FSD ) are the main independent variables. To test the 
validity of the regression results, the p values of the different diagnostic tests like Wald test, Sargan 
tests and first and second order serial correlation are reported (Note 6). 
Column 1 presents the results of the basic investment specification of model 1 where the coefficient of 
the lagged dependent variable is positive and highly significant at the 5% level, implying that 
investment made in the previous period influences actual investment level, probably due to habit 
formation by the firm. Once the firm has implemented a particular project in the previous period, it is in 
some way coerced to make another investment project in the following period in order to preserve 
employment level already created by the previous project, maintain the demand or simply to maintain 
good cash inflows in the business. 
Moreover, current output level positively increases investment level, in line with the acceleration 
principle. Higher demand increases investment level, assuming that all the necessary assumptions of 
the accelerator model holds. First and second order autocorrelation values do not seem to be 
problematic with very low p values while the high Wald Test (Note 7) coefficient implies that the group 
of variables rightly explain the equation. The identifying restrictions are valid with very low p values of 
the Sargan test. 
In column 2, we add the Index of Money Market Liberalisation (IMML) as another independent 
variable and find to find insignificant effect. This implies that development in the money market; such 
as open market operations, interest rate liberalisation or changes in the CRR have not affected private 
investment in Mauritius. The index of Capital Account Liberalisation (ICAL) has a larger but 
insignificant coefficient, implying that capital account openness also does not increase investment level. 
In column 4, the effect of the overall index of financial liberalisation is tested and insignificant effects 
are still found. The different diagnostic tests discussed above are good indication that efforts to 
liberalise the financial system have not been effective in influencing and promoting private investment. 
Column 5 includes the index of M2/GDP as another independent variable and a positive and significant 
impact on investment is noted, indicating that the larger the amount of money in circulation, the higher 
is private investment. Such a view is reinforced with an appropriate p value of 0.00 of the Sargan test, 
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joint significance of the model (p value of 0.00) and no serial autocorrelation. This is also the case in 
column 6, which includes the amount of bank credit to the private sector (BKCRE) over GDP as 
another independent variable to the basis equation. 
A highly positive and significant coefficient is found which implies that the higher amount of credit 
allocated to the private sector by banks, the higher is their level of investment. This follows the idea 
whereby the higher amount of external capital available allows firms to invest more. The coefficient of 
stock market capitalization to GDP (MKTCAP/GDP) in column 7 is positive but highly insignificant. 
Development of the stock market has therefore been ineffective in promoting private investment. 
Capital interlocking and a lack of diversification on the local market could explain such behaviour. 
Moreover, transaction and information costs are very high in our local market. 
In column 8, we test the impact of the amount of loans given by insurance companies on private 
investment by incorporating another variable, INSCRE/GDP in equation 1. We find the coefficient to 
be positive but insignificant, implying that insurance companies in Mauritius do not contribute to 
increase private investment. The model is accepted at the margin with a Sargan p value of 0.35 and a 
Wald test p value of 0.45. Moreover a p value of 0.35 for the second order autocorrelation implies that 
it was a valid model to be estimated. 
In column 9, we include the amount of lease given by leasing companies over GDP (LEASE/GDP) as 
an independent variable and observe a positive and significant coefficient of the variable on investment. 
A very high value of the Wald statistic was noted, reinforcing the validity of the model estimated. 
Moreover, a p value of 0.00 for the Sargan test implies that the identifying restrictions are valid. 
Leasing companies are effective in providing appropriate solutions to companies in the investment 
ventures. Companies find it easier and cheaper to lease assets on a long term rather than resorting to 
other sources of finance, such as stock market and loans. 
Column 10 includes the ratio of venture capital investment by venture capitalists over GDP as an 
independent variable and we observe an insignificant coefficient. Venture capitalist is still at its 
embryonic stage in Mauritius for private investment. 
However, the government bank, Development Bank of Mauritius is highly effective in the promotion of 
private investment. A wide range of tailor made products is available to different sector at 
concessionary interest rates. This is evidenced by a positive and significant coefficient of variable 
GVTLOAN/GDP, which is the amount of loans disbursed by the DBM over GDP. 
The overall index of financial sector development, which is an average of the different financial 
development indices used (OVERFIN, column 12), turns out to be positive and significant, implying 
that as the financial sector develops, private investment increases with the availability of more external 
financing and other products. The latter model is accepted with the different diagnostic tests reported, 
even though the test for second order autocorrelation is acceptable at the margin (p value of 0.415). 
We reinforce this view by including another variable to equation 1, the interaction between the index of 
financial sector development and index of financial sector liberalisation. We observe a positive but 
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much lower coefficient than the coefficient on the financial development index. This is the result of the 
insignificant financial liberalisation index. The coefficient in column 13 is significant suggesting that 
private investment is boasted up with development in the financial sector. In the last column we regress 
all variables discussed together on investment level. Statistical tests reveal that the model can be 
accepted and the results are consistent as discussed above. 
 
Table 1. Determinants of Investment-GMM Estimates of the Accelerator Model (Arellano and 
Bond in First Differences) 
Regressions: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
[Ii, t-1/Ki,t-2] 0.85 
(4.6)* 
0.32 
(5.2)* 
0.58 
(4.2)* 
0.69 
(3.9)* 
0.22 
(4.8)* 
0.66 
(3.6)* 
1.65 
(4.0)* 
[Yit/Ki,t-1] 1.32 
(6.3)* 
1.65 
(5.1)* 
1.48 
(9.0)* 
0.65 
(1.9)** 
1.24 
(2.2)** 
1.03 
(4.6)* 
0.95 
(7.3)* 
[Yit-1/Ki,t-2] 1.03 
(5.5)* 
0.65 
(3.9)* 
0.36 
(12.4)* 
0.24 
(6.6)* 
1.24 
(2.0)** 
0.25 
(9.7)* 
0.65 
(15.3)* 
INMMLIB  0.01 
(0.3) 
     
INCAL   0.04 
(0.5) 
    
OVEINDLIB    0.01 
(0.4) 
   
M2/GDP     2.05 
(7.5)* 
  
BKCRE/GDP      1.65 
(4.0)* 
 
MKTCAP/GDP       0.02 
(0.7) 
Number of observations 2086 2086 2086 2086 2086 2086 2086 
Number of firms 298 298 298 298 298 298 298 
Wald Test of joint signify (p)  0.00 0.001 0.3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 
Sargan Test (p) 0.82 0.68 0.92 1.00 1.00 0.69 0.94 
Arellano-Bond test of 1st 
order autocorr (p) 
0.000 0.000 0.0003 0.002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0004 
Arellano-Bond test of 2nd 
order autocorr (p) 
0.03 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.42 0.270 0.452 
Note. Dependent variable: [Iit/Ki,t-1]; Sample period: 1994-2007; t-statistics denoting significance are 
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reported in parentheses; * means significance of variable at the 1% level; while ** means significance 
at the 5% level. 
Source: Author. 
 
Table 1 (Continued). Determinants of Investment-GMM Estimates of the Accelerator Model 
(Arellano and Bond in First Differences) 
Regressions: 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
[Ii, t-1/Ki,t-2] 1.26 
(3.3)* 
0.56 
(5.1)* 
4.15 
(4.2)* 
0.37 
(2.9)* 
0.69 
(2.6)* 
0.65 
(4.2)* 
0.25 
(2.8)* 
[Yit/Ki,t-1] 0.89 
(12.3)* 
1.69 
(4.3)* 
1.25 
(5.6)* 
0.68 
(1.9)*
* 
1.87 
(5.9)* 
1.02 
(2.7)* 
1.68 
(5.4)* 
[Yit-1/Ki,t-2] 0.47 
(4.0)* 
0.35 
(2.1)** 
0.35 
(6.3)* 
0.02 
(5.4)* 
1.38 
(8.2)* 
0.04 
(8.5)* 
0.47 
(9.1)* 
INMMLIB       0.04 
(0.04) 
INCAL       0.14 
(0.25) 
OVEINDLIB       0.17 
(0.9) 
M2/GDP       1.7 
(8.8)* 
BKCRE/GDP       0.58 
(3.6)* 
MKTCAP/GDP       0.05 
(0.8) 
INSUCRED/GDP 0.08 
(0.4) 
     0.47 
(0.08) 
LEASE/GDP  0.021 
(5.3)* 
    0.004 
(5.55)* 
VENTU/GDP   0.47 
(0.24) 
   0.00 
(0.1) 
GVTLOAN/GDP    1.23 
(6.2)* 
  0.98 
(7.4)* 
OVEFINDEV     0.02 
(3.8)* 
 0.05 
(3.8)* 
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FIN.LIB* FINDEV      0.21 
(5.1)* 
0.04 
(12.4)* 
Number of observations 2086 2086 2086 2086 2086 2086 2086 
Number of firms 298 298 298 298 298 298 298 
Wald Test of joint significance (p values) 0.45 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sargan Test (p values) 1.00 1.00 0.68 0.74 0.76 1.00 1.00 
Arellano-Bond test of 1st order 
autocorrelation (p values) 
0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Arellano-Bond test of 2nd order 
autocorrelation (p values) 
0.365 0.421 0.214 0.354 0.415 0.000 0.000 
Note. Dependent variable: [Iit/Ki,t-1]; Sample period: 1994-2007; t-statistics denoting significance are 
reported in parentheses; * means significance of variable at the 1% level; while ** means significance 
at the 5% level. 
Source: Author. 
 
a) Sensitivity analysis 
We undertake a similar study using two more investment models, the error correction model and the 
Euler Equation (Note 8). The models are satisfactory as per the statistical tests and the error correction 
term is negative and significant throughout the various specifications. Investment level, which is above 
the long run desired level in period 1, is associated with a lower level in the following period. Strong 
evidence is found to support the fact that it is financial development rather than financial liberalisation 
that influences private investment. The results confirm that financial liberalisation has been rather 
ineffective in influencing private investment, unlike financial development. 
4.1.2 Empirical Test between External Financing and Capital Structure Choice 
We test the empirical relationship between availability of external financing such as FL policies on 
corporate capital structures. Based on the determinants of capital structure, this study moves from a 
general to a specific model. The following hybrid model of capital structure is considered: 
LEVit = 0 + 1TANGit + 2PROFit + 3SIZEit + 4 LIQUIDITYit + 5AGEit + 6NDTSit + 
7RISKSit + 8GROWTHit + eit(5) 
where LEV is a measure of corporate leverage, TANG measures asset tangibility, PROF is a measure of 
firm profitability, SIZE measures the relative sizes of firms, LIQUIDITY measures firms’ internal cash 
flow (based on fair valuation as per IFRS), AGE measures the relative age of firms, NDTS measures 
the amount of non-debt tax shields, RISKS measures firms’ risks, GROWTH measures the growth 
opportunities of firms and e is the random error term. i measures company element while t is the time 
dimension ranging from 1994 to 2007. 0 isa constant of the model, 1, 8 are the different 
coefficients to be estimated. 
Model 5 above is augmented to include macroeconomic variables, more specifically financial variables. 
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As a novelty in this study, the impact of FL and FSD on capital structure is tested separately. 
This Paper differentiates between the impact of the index of Money Market Liberalisation (IMML), the 
index of Capital Account Liberalisation (ICAL) and the Overall index of Liberalisation on capital 
structure. These have been computed using the PC method in appendix 5. Market clearing interest rates 
are expected to increase the supply of loanable funds in the market and may positively impact on 
leverage. Moreover, relaxation of monetary policy rules, such as reduction in the CRR of banks better 
allow them to release more credit in the financial system to ultimately impact on corporate leverage. 
Regulated financial markets force firms into self-financing and result in less efficient ventures. 
Liberalisation of the capital account might have similar impact through its channel. Moreover, there is a 
theoretical link between interest rates and the financial structure of firms. Interest rates affect their cost 
of capital to the investor as well as returns to various groups of savers. Any change in interest rate 
affects the WACC and consequently the debt/equity choice of firms. In general, the desired debt/equity 
ratio will be positively related to financial liberalisation and market deregulation. 
Financial Sector Development also impacts on corporate leverage. Various channels and transmission 
mechanisms via which FSD affects the debt/equity ratio of firms are considered. The impact of banking 
sector development and non-bank financial sector development on corporate leverage is analysed. 
Financial institutions have emerged with development in the economics of information and transaction 
costs. Besides their roles of asset transformation, they act as portfolio managers aiding firms choose 
their portfolio on the basis of returns and risks that they face in the market (Chant, 1992). 
Moreover, they offer transformation services and alter risks and returns by applying resources to better 
acquire and sell information, reap economies and scale and overcome transformation costs. They can 
also identify good quality firms, mitigate the moral hazard problems, and monitor projects. These 
together enable firms to borrow more and increase their leverage. Government banks provide loans at 
concessionary rates and influence their debt/equity ratios. 
The stock market plays (Note 9) a crucial role in corporate financing decisions and choices. It provides 
companies with additional, lower costs financial instruments according to their risk appetites and 
liquidity needs. It is also argued that stock markets sell information on firms that reduce costs of 
information searches to firms. Furthermore, companies diversify their investment risks by holding a 
portfolio of investments and thus might be more willing to hold equities rather than debt instruments, 
accentuated by a constant liquidity on the stock market. Efficient share markets better discipline firms. 
On the basis of theoretical underpinnings regarding the possible impact of financial sector 
development/liberalization on debt/equity ratios, equation 5 above is augmented by including financial 
liberalisation indices and financial sector development indicators as additional determinants of 
corporate debt, as explained below: 
a) Augmented model 
LEVit=0 + 1TANGit + 2PROFit + 3SIZEit + 4LIQUIDITYit + 5AGEit + 6NDTSit + 
7RISKSit + 8GROWTHit + 9FINLIBit + 10FINDEVit + eit(6) 
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Data collection and sensitivity analysis 
Data has been collected from the financial statements of companies available at the Registrar of 
Companies, Port Louis where firms have been filing their detailed financial statements since 1994. 
Some other pertinent data have been obtained from the SEM FactBook 2008 and the top 100 
Companies Magazine 2008 Edition. Table 2 explains the variables used in our hypothesis. 
For a more comprehensive analysis of debt/equity choices of firms in Mauritius and also to perform 
some robustness checks, a sensitivity analysis in some different sub-samples is undertaken. Data from 
an unbalanced sample of 298 firms across different sectors have been collected and classified according 
to good corporate governance, poor corporate governance, those in group structure v/s independent 
companies, international and domestic enterprises and listed v/s unlisted companies. The sample has 
further been sub-divided into the top 100 companies and “other companies”. To conduct a sectoral 
analysis, this study is undertaken in the study in the banking, insurance, hotels, manufacturing, 
construction, leasing, retail/distributive trade and oil industry. The variables used in this study are 
shown in Table 2 below: 
 
Table 2. Definition of Variables Used 
Variables Indicator used 
Leverage Summation of short and long term liabilities 
Tangibility Amount of fixed assets 
Size First difference of total assets 
Net-Liquidity Cash flow plus short-term illiquid investments and any liquid asset for which 
there is a readily available market 
Age Number of years since existence 
Non-debt Tax Shield Corporate tax relief available 
Risks Variability in annual turnover 
Growth Growth in turnover 
Profits Earnings (including interest payments, taxes and amounts for fall in the value 
of fixed assets) 
Financial Liberalisation Financial Liberalisation Index computed from the PC method. It is also 
decomposed between the index of capital account liberalisation and the index 
of money market liberalization 
Financial Development The following sensitivities: the ratio of M2 over GDP, total bank credit over 
GDP, market capitalization over GDP, total amount of corporate loans 
disbursed by insurance companies over GDP, investment in leasing activities 
over GDP, ratio of total investment by venture capitalists over GDP and total 
loans disbursed by government bank over GDP 
Source: Author. 
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A panel data methodology is adopted. Several diagnostic tests like the Hausman tests, Panel unit root 
tests, tests for model specification via the Ramsey test, we check for multicollinearity between our 
variables and also tests for presence of any heteroscedasticity. 
b) Analysis of results 
Econometric results of equations 6 above are shown in Table 3 below. Corporate leverage (debt/equity 
ratio) is used as explained variable and is computed as the sum of short term and long-term corporate 
liabilities. It is believed that this is a better measure of debt, as it envelops firms’ ability to borrow in 
the external market. The independent variables included are described in Table 3 above. Empirical 
results in the different sub-samples are reported in columns 1 to 22 in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. Influence of Financial Policies on Capital Structure of Firms 
Regressions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Dependent variable: 
LEV 
Total Total Top 100 Other Group Non-gro
up 
Local Inter. 
Constant -0.52 
(-3.5)* 
-0.43 
(-1.9)** 
2.58 
(7.5)* 
0.29 
(2.2) 
0.70 
(0.8) 
-2.60 
(-2.9)* 
8.75 
(7.5)* 
6.70 
(4.9)* 
TANG 0.11 
(10.4)* 
0.33 
(3.2)* 
0.54 
(5.2)* 
0.58 
(10.5)* 
0.34 
(12.3)* 
0.47 
(25.9)* 
0.32 
(5.6)* 
0.24 
(4.1)* 
PROF -6.84 
(-5.4) * 
-4.54 
(-8.8) * 
-0.002 
(-6.5) * 
-5.24 
(-3.6) * 
-0.005 
(-4.2) * 
-8.65 
(-5.8) * 
-7.86 
(-6.8) * 
-0.65 
(-5.5) * 
SIZE -0.27 
(11.6)* 
-0.03 
(6.5)* 
-0.09 
(0.64) 
-0.36 
(0.6) 
-0.23 
(0.1) 
-0.31 
(1.8) 
-0.17 
(1.6) 
-0.49 
(3.1)* 
LIQ -0.15 
(4.1) * 
-3.54 
(5.2) * 
-1.26 
(3.5) * 
-6.25 
(-10.2) * 
-0.03 
(-15.2) * 
-12.54 
(-3.5) * 
-6.41 
(-3.6) * 
-0.002 
(-6.2) * 
AGE 0.001 
(2.3)** 
0.01 
(2.0) ** 
0.01 
(1.6)  
0.02 
(1.9)** 
0.34 
(2.0)** 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.13) 
0.58 
(1.7) 
NDTS 0.054 
(1.0) 
0.002 
(0.65) 
0.04 
(1.0) 
0.02 
(0.5) 
0.35 
(0.6) 
-0.24 
(0.4) 
-0.01 
(0.3) 
0.21 
(0.3) 
RISKS -0.21 
(3.6) * 
-0.01 
(2.9) * 
-0.66 
(0.8) 
-0.54 
(6.5) * 
-0.004 
(11.2) * 
-0.36 
(6.8) * 
-3.25 
(5.2) * 
-0.54 
(3.4) * 
GROWTH -0.10 
(4.3)* 
-0.24 
(16.0) * 
-0.32 
(6.2) * 
-0.254 
(8.8) * 
-0.24 
(9.9) * 
-0.31 
(11.2) * 
-0.45 
(7.6) * 
-0.845 
(3.5) * 
IMML  0.52 
(1.2) 
0.02 
(0.1) 
0.77 
(1.1) 
0.36 
(0.8) 
0.96 
(0.1) 
0.21 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
ICAL  0.01 
(0.2) 
0.20 
(0.2) 
0.50 
(1.3) 
0.002 
(0.1) 
0.32 
(1.0) 
0.69 
(0.8) 
1.21 
(0.12) 
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FINLIB  0.95 
(1.0) 
0.67 
(1.1) 
3.25 
(0.3) 
1.54 
(0.01) 
3.21 
(1.3) 
0.59 
(0.9) 
0.27 
(0.01) 
M2/GDP  0.71 
(21.4) * 
2.64 
(13.1) * 
0.36 
(3.0) * 
0.37 
(4.01) * 
0.95 
(11.1) * 
0.36 
(9.0) * 
0.03 
(4.01) * 
BKCRE/GDP  0.01 
(3.2) * 
0.55 
(12.3) * 
0.01 
(5.6) * 
0.15 
(5.5) * 
0.10 
(3.2) * 
0.22 
(4.6) * 
0.33 
(9.2) * 
MKTCAP/GDP  0.24 
(0.1) 
0.21 
(0.25) 
0.2 
(1.35) 
0.002 
(1.6) 
0.005 
(1.2) 
0.12 
(.1) 
0.32 
(1.3) 
INSCRED/GDP  0.01 
(0.1) 
0.01 
(0.3) 
0.24 
(1.5) 
0.25 
(0.14) 
0.32 
(0.02) 
0.24 
(2.01) 
0.32 
(1.6) 
LEASE/GDP  0.001 
(18.1) * 
0.005 
(3.2) * 
0.007 
(3.4) * 
0.02 
(15.2) * 
0.05 
(9.7) * 
0.98 
(9.7) * 
0.021 
(10.4) * 
VENTU/GDP  0.02 
(0.3) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(1.3) 
0.02 
(2.0) 
0.002 
(1.0) 
0.95 
(0.5) 
0.24 
(2.0) 
GVTLOAN/GDP  0.02 
(5.2) * 
0.06 
(4.2) * 
0.04 
(8.2) * 
0.06 
(6.2) * 
0.547 
(12.5) * 
0.00 
(6.5) * 
0.0041 
(99.3) * 
OVEFIN 
DEV 
 2.54 
(3.5) * 
3.54 
(4.2) * 
2.01 
(7.7) * 
3.24 
(6.2) * 
4.24 
(3.2) * 
6.24 
(7.4) * 
2.34 
(8.0) * 
FIN.LIB* FINDEV  0.95 
(2.0) ** 
1.24 
(3.6) * 
0.68 
(8.2) * 
0.35 
(7.1) * 
0.67 
(3.9) * 
3.95 
(5.2) * 
4.66 
(6.0) * 
Number of observa 3874 3874 1300 2574 2580 1079 2535 1339 
Number of firms 298 298 100 198 215  83 195 103 
Hausman test statistics 0.9997 0.5490 0.9981 0.9988 0.1123 0.9994 0.0068 0.5944 
R2 0.774 0.8769 0.767 0.896 0.761 0.892 0.998 0.725 
Methodol GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS OLS GLS 
FE or RE RE RE RE RE RE RE FE RE 
Diagnostic test for 
Heteros 
Chi2(1)  
=4.02 
Prob>Chi 
=0.96 
Chi2(1) 
=3.17 
Prob>Ch 
=0.40 
Chi2(1) 
=2.93 
Prob>Ch
=0.22 
Chi2(1)
=4.68 
Pr>Chi=
0.35 
Chi2(1) 
=5.68 
Prb>Chi
=0.24 
Chi2(1) 
=6.02 
Prb>Chi 
=0.254 
Chi2(1)
=3.58 
Pr>Chi 
=0.32 
Chi2(1) 
=2.69 
Pr>Chi 
=0.28 
Ramsey test of model 
specific 
Prob>F 
=0.28 
Prob>F 
=0.31 
Prob>F 
=0.07 
Prob>F 
=0.16 
Prob>F 
=0.193 
Prob>F 
=0.282 
Prob>F
=0.148 
Prob>F 
=0.08 
Note. Sample period: 1994-2007; t-statistics denoting significance are reported in parentheses; * means 
significance of variable at the 1% level; while ** means significance at the 5% level. 
Source: Author. 
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Table 3 (Continued). Influence of Financial Policies on Capital Structure of Firms 
Regressions: 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 Good 
Banking Rel. 
Poor Banking 
Rel. 
Good Cor. 
Gov 
Poor Cor. 
Gov 
Listed Unlisted Banks 
Constant 6.28 
(6.7) * 
0.54 
(2.5) * 
0.83 
(0.5) 
0.77 
(4.8) * 
1.12 
(10.) * 
1.09 
(4.6) * 
1.41 
(4.3) * 
TANG 0.33 
(5.6)* 
0.85 
(3.5) * 
0.52 
(6.1) * 
0.48 
(3.0) * 
0.21 
(6.8) * 
0.04 
(3.01) * 
0.35 
(5.3) * 
PROF -10.14 
(-3.8) * 
-0.25 
(-3.7) * 
-0.02 
(-8.7) * 
-5.2(-4.5) 
* 
-0.3(-6.4) 
* 
-4.7(-7.7) 
* 
-0.18 
(-4.8) * 
SIZE -0.49 
(1.2) 
-0.49 
(9.7) * 
-2.12 
(2.9) * 
-0.98 
(13.) * 
-1.25 
(3.8) * 
-0.79 
(3.6) * 
-0.04 
(4.2) * 
LIQ -0.45(-6.4) * -15.24 
(7.4) * 
5.87 
(-3.5) * 
0.05 
(-8.5) * 
-0.54 
(-10.6) * 
-6.44 
(-9.8) * 
-0.004 
(-6.2) * 
AGE 0.024 
(0.67) 
0.08 
(2.5) ** 
0.03 
(0.8) 
0.08 
(2.0) ** 
0.03 
(0.5) 
0.002 
(2.4) ** 
0.027 
(2.3) ** 
NDTS 0.007 
(0.3) 
0.21 
(0.2) 
-0.02 
(-1.2) 
-0.34 
(0.3) 
-0.18 
(0.6) 
0.14 
(0.4) 
0.33 
(0.4) 
RISKS 0.004 
(10.2) * 
-0.42 
(8.2) * 
-0.54 
(2.8) * 
-0.64 
(0.2) 
-0.36 
(5.8) * 
-6.98 
(5.9) * 
-0.01 
(-3.3) * 
GROWTH -4.59 
(0.1) 
-12.59 
(17.0) * 
-0.44 
(3.6) * 
-0.22 
(0.7) 
-0.04 
(3.7) * 
-0.02 
(12.0) * 
-6.75 
(4.2) * 
IMML 0.88 
(0.03) 
0.16 
(0.9) 
3.81 
(0.1) 
1.82 
(0.3) 
0.11 
(0.4) 
0.14 
(0.1) 
0.12 
(0.9) 
ICAL 0.10 
(0.2) 
0.18 
(0.5) 
0.35 
(0.1) 
0.10 
(0.1) 
0.67 
(0.8) 
0.21 
(0.1) 
0.88 
(0.0) 
FINLIB 3.45 
(0.1) 
0.89 
(0.9) 
0.42 
(0.1) 
0.47 
(0.3) 
13.2 
(0.6) 
0.88 
(1.6) 
0.12 
(0.3) 
M2/GDP 0.09 
(3.2) * 
0.35 
(5.0) * 
0.04 
(16.0) * 
0.01 
(2.9) * 
0.01 
(3.0) * 
0.48 
(7.2) * 
0.52 
(5.2) * 
BKCRE/GDP 0.05 
(15.3) * 
0.04 
(3.1) * 
0.25 
(3.4) * 
0.29 
(13.2) * 
0.70 
(8.8) * 
0.66 
(14.2) * 
16.5 
(5.7) * 
MKTCAP/GDP 2.14 
(1.2) 
0.62 
(0.6) 
0.34 
(0.2) 
0.54 
(2.0) 
0.02 
(0.5) 
0.34 
(0.9) 
0.31 
(0.2) 
INSCRED/GDP 0.01 
(0.8) 
0.06 
(0.8) 
0.065 
(0.5) 
0.24 
(0.6) 
0.32 
(0.6) 
0.21 
(0.2) 
0.55 
(0.4) 
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LEASE/GDP 0.87 
(14.2) * 
1.06 
(10.3) * 
0.12 
(13.2) * 
0.54 
(10.2) * 
0.53 
(5.2) * 
0.01 
(11.2) * 
0.39 
(15.0) * 
VENTU/GDP 0.002 
(0.6) 
0.21 
(0.2) 
0.002 
(0.84) 
0.003 
(0.4) 
0.008 
(0.25) 
0.002 
(1.54) 
0.87 
(1.6) 
GVTLOAN/GDP 0.81 
(14.2) * 
0.11 
(8.9 * 
0.12 
(11.8) * 
0.96 
(13.1) * 
0.62 
(7.6) * 
0.18 
(3.6) * 
0.006 
(3.0) * 
OVEFINDEV 6.65 
(3.6) * 
8.62 
(3.6) * 
4.74 
(3.3) * 
1.63 
(5.1) * 
2.35 
(4.8) * 
3.07 
(4.8) * 
1.33 
(3.4) * 
FIN.LIB* FINDEV 0.52 
(2.9) * 
3.54 
(8.2) * 
2.13 
(6.2) * 
0.80 
(3.5) * 
0.005 
(6.5) * 
1.58 
(3.6) * 
0.68 
(3.1) * 
Number of 
observations 
2002 1872 1404 2470 494 3380 234 
Number of firms 154 144 108 190 38 260 18 
Hausman test 
statistics 
0.9744 0.3566 0.990 0.9978 0.9685 0.9738 0.9262 
R2 0.687 0.887 0.874 0.587 0.547 0.758 0.547 
Methodology GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS 
FE or RE RE RE RE RE RE RE RE 
Diagnostic test for 
Heteroscedasticity 
Chi2(1) 
=6.74 
Prob>Chi 
=0.09 
Chi2(1) 
=5.64 
Prob>Chi 
=0.06 
Chi2(1) 
=4.02 
Prob>Chi 
=0.069 
Chi2(1) 
=2.35 
Prob>Chi
=0.098 
Chi2(1) 
=6.12 
Prob>Chi
=0.125 
Chi2(1) 
=2.44 
Prob>Chi
=0.35 
Chi2(1) 
=5.14 
Prob>Chi
=0.54 
Ramsey test of model 
specification 
Prob>F 
=0.06 
Prob>F 
=0.12 
Prob>F 
=0.06 
Prob>F 
=0.158 
Prob>F 
=0.098 
Prob>F 
=0.65 
Prob>F 
=0.14 
Note. t-statistics denoting significance are reported in parentheses; * means significance of variable at 
the 1% level; while ** means significance at the 5% level. 
Source: Author. 
 
Table 3 (continued). Influence of Financial Policies on Capital Structure of Firms 
Regressions 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
Dependent variable: 
LEVERAGE 
Insurance Leasing Hotels Manuf Oil Dis. Trade Construction 
Constant -1.41 
(-5.2) * 
2.77 
(2.1) 
-2.35 
(-1.3) 
0.86 
(7.3) * 
4.91 
(13.6) * 
9.94 
(2.2) * 
4.00 
(3.3) * 
TANG 0.21 
(8.1) * 
0.87 
(4.4) * 
0.65 
(7.2) * 
0.47 
(4.1) * 
0.21 
(6.3) * 
0.68 
(5.2) * 
0.32 
(8.1) * 
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PROF -0.12 
(-5.0) * 
-0.47 
(-3.4) * 
-0.37 
(-10.0) * 
-0.25 
(6.2) * 
-0.09 
(-4.2) * 
-0.57 
(-6.2) * 
-0.82 
(-5.6) * 
SIZE -0.01 
(1.8) 
-0.04 
(1.07) 
-0.01 
(1.01) 
-0.05 
(0.5) 
-1.16 
(0.3) 
-1.17 
(0.6) 
-0.83 
(2.4) 
LIQ -0.32 
(-4.2) * 
-0.87 
(-10.6) * 
-0.55 
(-8.5) * 
-0.54 
(-4.5) * 
-0.54 
(-10.3) * 
-0.45 
(-10.8) * 
-3.54 
(-6.8) * 
AGE 0.04 
(2.2) ** 
0.05 
(1.4) 
0.01 
(0.4) 
0.019 
(0.4) 
0.019 
(2.2) ** 
0.08 
(0.18) 
0.37 
(1.8) 
NDTS 0.54 
(0.54) 
0.21 
(1.0) 
0.56 
(0.3) 
0.025 
(1.3) 
0.21 
(1.4) 
0.67 
(0.8) 
0.32 
(0.7) 
RISKS -0.003 
(-2.8) * 
-0.65 
(-1.9)** 
-0.35 
(-5.8) * 
-0.01 
(-4.9) * 
-0.69 
(-6.8) * 
-0.98 
(-8.8) * 
-0.84 
(-1.8) 
GROWTH -14.3 
(9.1) * 
-0.49 
(20.1) * 
-2.56 
(20.1) * 
-0.13 
(7.8) * 
-0.01 
(14.8) * 
-0.92 
(0.1) 
-0.41 
(1.1) 
IMML 0.70 
(0.1) 
(0.01) 
(0.08) 
0.004 
(0.4) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.09 
(1.6) 
0.003 
(0.001) 
0.14 
(0.005) 
ICAL 0.16 
(0.90) 
3.81 
(1.5) 
1.83 
(0.31) 
0.11 
(0.2) 
0.011 
(0.2) 
0.002 
(0.11) 
0.10 
(0.11) 
FINLIB 0.16 
(0.69) 
0.42 
(0.8) 
0.78 
(1.1) 
0.28 
(0.7) 
0.51 
(1.3) 
0.23 
(0.3) 
0.15 
(0.65) 
M2/GDP 0.94 
(3.6) * 
0.006 
(6.2) * 
0.01 
(6.5) * 
.038 
(4.2) * 
0.15 
(5.8) * 
0.69 
(6.2) * 
0.21 
(5.2) * 
BKCRE/GDP 0.003 
(5.2) * 
0.001 
(6.2) * 
0.005 
(10.2) * 
0.001 
(4.2) * 
1.77 
(15.1) * 
1.77 
(15.0) * 
1.46 
(3.2) * 
MKTCAP/GDP 0.32 
(0.2) 
0.120 
(0.10) 
0.20 
(0.1) 
0.33 
(0.4) 
0.86 
(0.3) 
0.86 
(0.0) 
0.52 
(0.005) 
INSCRED/GDP 0.19 
(0.28) 
0.25 
(0.22) 
0.51 
(0.4) 
0.51 
(0.2) 
0.25 
(0.2) 
0.28 
(0.0001) 
0.25 
(0.5) 
LEASE/GDP 0.005 
(12.0) * 
0.07 
(15.2) * 
0.003 
(12.0) * 
0.003 
(11.2) * 
0.11 
(13.0)* 
0.12 
(15.3) * 
0.32 
(13.02) * 
VENTU/GDP 0.67 
(1.3) 
0.36 
(0.9) 
0.54 
(0.2) 
0.35 
(0.01) 
0.83 
(1.4) 
0.77 
(0.16) 
0.06 
(0.003) 
GVTLOAN/GDP 0.18 
(7.7) * 
0.33 
(9.4) * 
0.72 
(3.6) * 
0.96 
(3.4) * 
0.65 
(8.5) * 
0.015 
(4.2) * 
0.62 
(8.2) * 
OVEFINDEV 3.28 
(3.0) * 
1.12 
(4.0) * 
1.09 
(6.2) * 
0.52 
(3.3) * 
0.34 
(5.5) * 
0.21 
(385) * 
0.31 
(492) * 
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FIN.LIB* FINDEV 1.03 
(4.5) * 
0.40 
(15.9) * 
0.15 
(6.3) * 
0.41 
(3.8) * 
0.60 
(3.1) * 
0.11 
(2.7) * 
0.18 
(3.8) * 
Number of observations 260 156 845 1196 52 507 858 
Number of firms 20 12 65 92 4 39 66 
Hausman test statistics 0.005 0.3475 0.0001 1.000 0.0003 0.5353 0.4952 
R2 0.658 0.724 0.658 0.865 0.654 0.741 0.658 
Methodology OLS GLS OLS GLS OLS GLS GLS 
FE or RE FE RE FE RE FE RE RE 
Diagnostic test for  
heteroscedasticity 
Chi2(1) 
=7.21 
Prob>Chi
=0.125 
Chi2(1) 
=4.36 
Prob>Chi
=0.154 
Chi2(1) 
=6.24 
Prob>Chi
=0.286 
Chi2(1) 
=4.35 
Prob>Chi
=0.136 
Chi2(1) 
=2.98 
Prob>Chi
=0.245 
Chi2(1) 
=8.21 
Prob>Chi 
=0.324 
Chi2(1) 
=6.54 
Prob>Chi 
=0.198 
Ramsey test of model 
specification 
Prob>F 
=0.12 
Prob>F 
=0.065 
Prob>F 
=0.08 
Prob>F 
=0.19 
Prob>F 
=0.097 
Prob>F 
=0.10 
Prob>F 
=0.078 
Note. Sample period: 1994-2007; t-statistics denoting significance are reported in parentheses; * means 
significance of variable at the 1% level; while ** means significance at the 5% level. 
Source: Author. 
 
The different models are estimated with either OLS or GLS estimates. Column 1 shows the 
econometric results estimated from a panel data of 298 companies across different sectors. It is 
observed that asset tangibility has a significant and positive coefficient on leverage, implying that the 
more tangible assets firms have, the more their ability to pledge them and thus a higher probability to 
obtain more credit from the market. Similar results have been obtained across the different 
sub-samples. 
Firm size however, has a significant and negative coefficient on leverage. This might be indicative that 
firms do not increase their leverage as they grow in size, an embryonic proof of the POH. They prefer 
to use internal financing that has been accumulated through retained earnings and other reserves over 
time. Other reasons that might explain this is their difficulty in obtaining finance from the external 
market and scale diseconomies with growth. However, in some sub-samples (top 100 companies, 
“other” companies, “group” and “non-group” companies, local and those with good banking 
relationships), size does not influence leverage. These companies appear to be solid internally and may 
resort to an internal financial market that might exist within their group. 
Age of firms has significant and positive impact on leverage, implying that age might be used as 
signals of reputation and credibility in the market to better access the credit market and ultimately 
allows firms to use more credit from the market. However, the coefficient of age is very low throughout 
all the different regressions, implying that age has a very low influence on leverage. Yet, the 
coefficients are accepted at the 5% level only in the following sectors: total sample, other, group, poor 
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banking relationship, poor corporate governance, unlisted firms, banks, oil and insurance companies. 
Another variable, non-debt tax shield, has also been included in the regressions. An insignificant 
coefficient is noted across the board, indicating that the benefits available (tax relief) on investments 
and research and development expenditure do not influence corporate leverage. Infact, such tax benefits 
are very low in Mauritius and are seldom available. Very few firms undertake such investments to 
benefit from such tax shields. Moreover, the tax system of the MRA is different from other countries 
such as the UK and the U.S.A system where companies benefit from non-debt tax shields and they thus 
significantly influence their propensity to manipulate their debt/equity ratio. 
Firm growth has been measured as their growth achieved in the market, indicated by average changes 
in their turnover. A significant and negative coefficient is found in most samples. This is indicative that 
there is a negative relationship between market growth and the debt/equity ratio of firms. The same 
principle explanation as attributed to the relationship between leverage and firm size might explain 
such a relationship, again reinforcing the preliminary and indirect view that firms in Mauritius follow 
the POH and prefer to use internal financing to finance growth. However, market growth cannot 
explain firm leverage in the case of firms with good banking relationship, those with poor corporate 
governance, firms in the distributive trade and those in the construction sector. 
Risk management is a crucial exercise in any enterprise. Empirical research has demonstrated that risks 
are important determinants of firm debt/equity ratios. We include firm risk as another regressand. A 
significant and negative coefficient is observed across most sectors, meaning that the higher the risks of 
firms (measured in terms of earnings variability, either caused by alterations in market conditions 
adverse changes in operations), the lower leverage they are. They may fear that adverse conditions may 
end them in insolvency and they would not be able to honour the liability obligations. They therefore 
prefer not to increase debts level and may resort to internal finance. 
However, contrary results are found in the sub sample of firms with good banking relationship. 
Because of good ties and easy access to bank loans, “risks” are probably regarded as positive signals to 
banks that the firms are undertaking profitable and viable investments and they therefore get more 
loans from banks. Insignificant effects of risks are found in the construction sector, those with poor 
corporate governance and the top 100 companies. 
Two variables of internal finance, firm profitability and internal liquidity are included. These variables 
do not correlate with each other and offer different insights. Profitability is measured with the amount 
of return on firms’ assets while internal liquidly incorporate the availability of internal cash flow, net 
liquid assets and short-term liquid investments for which there is a readily available market. This is 
infact a novelty variable used as independent variable in the study of capital structure theories. A 
significant and negative relationship between corporate leverage and profitability is observed. 
Thus, the higher the profits of firms, the less they tend to borrow from the external market. They prefer 
to resort to internal financing, as predicted by the POH. Robustness of this result has been verified with 
the coefficients on the liquidity variable. Again, a significant and negative relationship with leverage is 
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observed across the board, to reinforce the view that firms follow pecking order behaviour in terms of 
financing. The coefficients, however, vary across the different sub-samples. A higher coefficient is 
observed for the “other companies”, indicating that they depend more on internal financing than the top 
100 companies. 
Group companies illustrate a much lower coefficient than independent companies, reinforcing the view 
that they have an internal financial market, which they prefer to resort to, rather than borrowing in the 
external market. Independent companies, however, have no choice. This is also the case for local 
companies when companies to international companies that might obtain easy finance from their head 
office company of in the international financial market. 
Analysis from a sub sample of firms with very good banking ties reveal that they can easily obtain 
finance from banks and increase their leverage accordingly. This is also the case for firms with good 
corporate governance structures, which allow them to credibly signal their quality to finance providers 
and increase their liabilities to fund projects. Firms in the following sectors resort more to internal 
financing than others: banks, hotels, distributive trade, and construction sector. 
The overall index of financial liberalization has been disaggregated into the index (FINLIB) into the 
Index of Capital Account Liberalisation (ICAL) and the Money Market Liberalisation Index (IMML) 
and included in our regression. The different indices have a positive but insignificant impact on 
corporate leverage. Financial liberalisation programmes cannot explain corporate leverage in Mauritius. 
In contrast, the overall financial development index has a positive and significant relationship with 
leverage. Development of the financial sector allows firms a wider choice of financial instruments and 
products and they increase their liabilities accordingly. The coefficient of broad money liabilities over 
GDP positively impacts of the debt/equity ratio and more money into circulation allow more credit in 
the financial system. In the same vein, the higher the amount of credit disbursed towards the private 
sector by banks, the more the debt amount of banks and firms in Mauritius prefer to use bank loans 
rather than other sources such as equity financing. 
They also make use of leasing finance, which has a significant and positive impact on corporate 
leverage. Our result is therefore different from Singh and Hamid (1992). The coefficient of stock 
market capitalization over GDP is insignificant across the different sub-sectors to explain corporate 
leverage. Many companies also resort to government loans such as from the DBM, which positively 
impact on their debt/equity ratios. The other institutions, such as venture capitals and insurance 
companies are still at their infancy in explaining the debt/equity ratio of firms. 
In this part, we have econometrically analysed the various determinants of capital structure in different 
sub-samples of firms and have found that the results are different for different categories of firms in 
different sub samples. The different econometric results are reliable as they have the right coefficient of 
determination. Moreover, the diagnostic tests confirm that the regressions do not suffer from neither 
multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity nor from the problem of omitted variables. 
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5. Conclusion 
This paper has provided additional evidence on the relationship between availability of external 
financing, both from a policy perspective as well as with regard to development in the financial sector 
on corporate strategies. By employing different econometric investment models, we found that all 
indices of FL, including the index of money market liberalisation, index of capital account 
liberalisation and overall financial liberalisation index have do not have any influence on private 
investment behaviour. In contract, higher amount of money in circulation, bank credit, leasing activities 
and subsidised financing from the Development bank have a positive impact on private investment 
expenditures. Development in the financial sector in terms of credit facilities offered by insurance 
companies, venture capitals and the stock market activities have not been effective in inducing firms to 
increase their investment portfolios. Thus, the empirical results obtained in this study add to the 
existing body of knowledge in on the above mentioned hypotheses in the case of a small island 
developing states. Results from this research, as summarized above serve as the basis for effective 
policy making at firm levels. We have also tested the impact of FL and FSD on corporate capital 
structures. We have divided the sample of firms differently, as well as across different sectors and used 
an improved measure of internal liquidity. Results from a stationary panel data from an augmented 
capital structure model, with macroeconomic financial variables have shown different results. The main 
determinants of corporate leverage are asset tangibility, firm size, firm growth, age, growth, risks, 
profitability and liquidity. However, the relative impact of each of these variables varies across the 
different sub-samples. Firms in groups and international companies operate an internal financial market 
and easily obtain finance. This is also the case for those with good banking ties. Further results have 
shown a nil effect of financial liberalization on capital structure decisions, unlike financial sector 
development. It has also been proved that the stock market does not influence capital structure choice, 
results contrary to what Hamid and Singh (1992) found for developing countries. We found that 
subsidized Government financing and leasing companies increases corporate leverage but other 
institutions such as private venture capitalists, insurance companies cannot explain leverage. The 
results obtained in this study are in line with the results obtained by Demirgue-Kuntand Maksimovic 
(1992, 1994, 1996), as well as Agarwal and Mohtadi (2004) for the case of developing countries. 
However, it differs from that of Seetanah and Padachi (2007) who found that stock market development 
increased debt for non-financial firms while this was not the case for listed financial firms. This can be 
explained by some pertinent macro variables such as FL and FSD which were not accounted for by 
these authors. The authorities should therefore adopt appropriate policies to make stock market 
financing more accessible to firms in the post FL period. 
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Notes 
Note 1. Kadapakkam et al. (1998) found the results for OECD countries, including the US. 
Note 2. 1,848 firms from both manufacturing and services sector were used while for Brazil, 1642 
firms from 9 manufacturing sectors were used. 
Note 3. Henforth, FHP. 
Note 4. e.g., controversy on the cash flow variable used. 
Note 5. Financial liberalization policies are expected to impact on the firm by removing and easing 
financial constraint and allow firms to have easy access to external financing. This is done through a 
more effective operation of the market forces to determine the allocation of resources, such as interest 
rates and the availability of finance. In contrast, FSD refers to development if instructions such as 
banks and whereby more financial resources is made at the disposal of firms. 
Note 6. The Wald test tests the joint significance of the variables in the regression specified and the 
Sargan test tests the over identifying restrictions. The first and second order autocorrelation of 
Arrellano and Bond test for first order serial correlation in the residuals. 
Note 7. Statistics not reported due to intensity. Available upon request from author. 
Note 8. Results available from Authors. 
Note 9. See Dermirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) for a theoretical and empirical review on the 
impact of stock market development on debt/equity ratio of firms. 
